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SYMPOSIUM
THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: A
REPLY TO THREE COMMENTATORS
Richard L. Hasen*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Journal of Legislation and Notre Dame Law School invited three distinguished
scholars to comment on my recent book, The Supreme Court and Election Law,2 and
have kindly given me this chance to reply. The commentators' arguments are
interesting and provocative. After a brief summary of the main points of my book, I
focus on what I consider to be the central critical claim of each commentator.
3
Professor Nagle gently suggests that election law itself may not be a coherent field of
study, noting that much election law jurisprudence appears to turn on matters of
appearance over that of substance.4 Professor Fuentes-Rohwer agrees with much of my
analysis, but argues that I do not go far enough-suggesting that the logical end-point
of my argument is for the Supreme Court to extricate itself from the political thicket
entirely.5 Professor Charles argues that my distinction between core and contested
equality rights eliminates any purpose for judicial review and is too difficult to put into
practice.
6
In this Reply, I defend my approach. Professor Nagle is correct that the Court often
strays from the right path when it decides election law cases on appearances alone, but
he fails to recognize how conceiving of election law synthetically informs Court
decision-making on issues such as the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims.
Professor Fuentes-Rohwer's general suggestion that the Court exit from the political
thicket has much to commend it in the abstract, but he fails to evaluate my proposal as a
"second best" approach, particularly compared to the main alternative floating around
election law circles today: the structuralist approach that focuses on "appropriate"
political competition. Finally, Professor Charles puts his finger on the most difficult
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
1. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Law, Politics, and Judicial Review: A Comment on Hasen, 31 J. LEGIS 17
(2005); John Copeland Nagle, The Appearance of Election Law, 31 J. LEGIS. 37 (2005); Luis Fuentes-
Rohwer, Of Platonic Guardians, Trust and Equality: A Comment on Hasen 's Minimalist Approach to the
Law of Elections, 31 J. LEGIs 25 (2005).
2. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER v
CARR TO BUSH v. GORE (2003).
3. Naturally, there is much about which we all agree. I focus here on the most important disagreements.
4. See generally Nagle, supra note 1.
5. See generally Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 1.
6. See generally Charles, supra note 1.
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aspect of my book, and I welcome his decision to take my proposed distinction between
core and contested equality claims seriously.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW IN A NUTSHELL
7
The Supreme Court and Election Law examines the Supreme Court's role in
regulating the U.S. political process since its 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr,8 when the
Court first held reapportionment claims justiciable. 9 Before 1962, the Supreme Court
decided an average of ten election law cases per decade with a written opinion.' 0 After
1962, the number of cases increased to sixty per decade, and the percentage of election
law cases as a portion of the entire Supreme Court docket went up by more than seven-
fold. " I
Along the way, the Court has: required the reapportionment of virtually every
legislative body in the country to comply with the principle of "one person, one vote";
ended the practice of political patronage employment; prevented local governments,
states, and the federal government from limiting campaign spending in the name of
political equality; curtailed the extent to which legislatures may take race into account
in drawing district lines; and most recently (and, some would add, notoriously)
determined the outcome of the 2000 presidential election.
12
The book has four central objectives: (1) to chronicle the Supreme Court's political
equality cases; (2) to give the Court tools to use to decide such cases carefully; (3) to
make a substantive argument for when the Court should intervene in political equality
cases; and (4) to argue against structuralist interpretations of election law.
Chapter One surveys the Supreme Court's regulation of political equality since
1960 in four key areas: formal equality requirements, wealth, race, and political parties.
Rather than canvass every case that arguably falls into each of these categories, the
survey shows general trends. The Chapter concludes with a look at Bush v. Gore,13 the
2000 presidential election case.
Chapter Two argues for the use of judicially unmanageable standards in deciding
election law cases. My claim is that the Court, in cases involving contested political
equality issues, initially should use murky or unclear standards in articulating new
political rights. Unclear standards lead to variations in the lower courts, and the
7. This part of my article is a modified version of HASEN, supra note 2, at 10-13.
8. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
9. See id. at 209.
10. See HASEN, supra note 2, at 1, 3 fig.l.1.
11. See id. at 1, 3 fig.l.2.
12. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568-69 (1964) (mandating reapportionment on state level);
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 478 (1968) (mandating reapportionment of local body); but see
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 727-28 (1973) (carving out
exception to one person, one vote rule for special purpose government districts); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S.
347, 350 (1976) (banning patronage firing); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1990)
(banning patronage hiring, transfers and promotions); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-29 (1976) (rejecting
political equality as a compelling interest justifying campaign spending limits); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
658 (1993) (creating cause of action for an "unconstitutional racial gerrymander"); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,
103 (2000) (striking down recount rules created by Florida Supreme Court in 2000 presidential recount
controversy).
13. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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Supreme Court can learn from such variations the best way to ultimately craft new
political equality rules.
Chapter Three argues that the Court should play a central role in protecting the core
of three equality principles: the "essential political rights" principle, the "anti-
plutocracy" principle, and the "collective action" principle. The three principles are
limits on the government's power to treat people differently in the political process.
The principles are derived primarily from social consensus (or near consensus) about
the contemporary understanding of political equality, and Chapter Three defends this
basis for determining the scope of political equality claims.
The "essential political rights" principle prevents the government from interfering
with basic political rights and requires equal treatment of votes and voters. The "anti-
plutocracy" principle prevents the government from conditioning meaningful
participation in the political process on wealth or money. The "collective action"
principle prevents the government from impeding through unreasonable restrictions the
ability of people to organize into groups for political action.
Chapter Three argues that if the government attempts to place a limit on the
exercise of one of these three core political equality principles, the Court, with an eye
on legislative self-interest and agency problems, must engage in a skeptical balancing of
interests. This kind of balancing is very different from the deferential balancing we
have seen from the Court, particularly in recent years when it has acted to protect the
Democratic and Republican parties from political competition. Although the Court's
role is to protect the core, the Court should not act on its own to take sides in cases
involving contested equality principles. When a plaintiff raises such a claim, the Court
should reject its constitutionalization.
Instead, as Chapter Four explains, it is up to Congress or state and local legislative
bodies (or the people, in those jurisdictions with an initiative process) to decide whether
to expand political equality principles into contested areas. The Court generally should
defer to such decisions, if the Court can be confident that the legislature's intent is to
foster equality rather than engage in self-dealing. Chapter Four examines whether the
Court's treatment of campaign finance laws and the Voting Rights Act is consistent
with this idea, arguing that the Court was wrong to reject the equality rationale for
campaign finance regulation in its initial campaign finance cases. The Court appears
poised to go down the wrong path in the Voting Rights Act cases as well, perhaps
holding major provisions of the Act unconstitutional as exceeding Congress's power to
enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Chapters Three and Four defend strict balancing tests as appropriate in the political
equality cases. The balancing called for differs significantly from the Court's balancing
tests by requiring a close connection between legislative means and ends as an indirect
way to police legislative self-interest. Nonetheless, balancing represents the typical
way that the Court has (at least ostensibly) handled such claims in the past.
A reader familiar with the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence might not
think balancing needs much defending. To the contrary, however, we are in the midst
of a disturbing trend, moving away from a focus on individual rights and toward
"structural arguments" about workings of the political system. Chapter Five considers
these structural arguments, which have come from both the Court in its racial
2004]
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gerrymandering cases such as Shaw v. Reno, 14 and from some election law scholars,
calling for the Court to promote a certain kind of political competition rather than
engage in what they term "sterile" balancing of individual rights and state interests. Far
from being a sterile concept, equality claims, both individual and group, remain at the
core of how the court should evaluate election law claims. Structural arguments,
whether made by the Court or commentators, are misguided and potentially dangerous.
They evince judicial hubris, a belief that judges appropriately should be cast in the role
of supreme political regulators.
In sum, the book argues in favor of preserving room for Supreme Court
intervention in the political process, but for intervention that is (1) tentative and
malleable, (2) focused on individual (or sometimes group) rights and not on the
"structure" or "functioning" of the political system, (3) protective of core political
equality principles, and (4) deferential to political branches' attempts to promote
contested visions of political equality.
III. NAGLE AND THE APPEARANCE OF ELECTION LAW
Much like Gertrude Stein's description of the city of Oakland, 15 Professor Nagle's
description of "election law" suggests the field may not exist. 16 Professor Nagle (who
teaches a course in this field) 17 does not mean that the discipline itself does not exist
within academic institutions; election law-or the law of democracy 18-surely is
thriving as a subject studied in law schools and elsewhere. 19 Rather, Professor Nagle
suggests that the search for a "unified theory" of election law may unfortunately
"encourage the viewing of all legal issues related to elections through the lens of the
viewer's particular normative aspiration for elections." He concludes that "the laws
governing elections may reflect a patchwork of insights, just like the laws enacted by
those who are elected."
2 1
Professor Nagle is particularly concerned about the search for a unified theory in
light of the Supreme Court's tendency to decide' election law cases on the basis of
"appearances": the appearance of corruption justifies campaign finance regulations; 22
the bizarre appearance of districts justifies striking down certain state districting
14. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
15. "[T]here is no there there." GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937, reprinted
1971).
16. Nagle, supra note 1, at 43-44.
17. See Election Law Teacher Database, at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/database.xls (last visited
Nov. 10, 2004).
18. There is considerable debate over what to name the field. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H.
Pildes, Election Law As Its Own Field of Study: Not by "Election Law" Alone, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1173,
1183 (1999) (defending the alternative "law of democracy" label).
19. See Symposium. Election Law as Its Own Field of Study, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1095, 1095-96
(1999); Heather K. Gerken, Election Law Exceptionalism? A Bird's Eye View of the Symposium, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 737, 738 (2002); Richard H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3
ELECTION L.J. 685, 696 (book review) (noting that most major law schools besides Yale have at least one
faculty member specializing in this field).
20. Nagle, supra note I, at 43.
21. Id. at44.
22. Id. at 39-40 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
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plans;23 and the appearance of unfairness of the Florida recount process leading to the
decision to end the recount in Bush v. Gore.24  On this narrower point about
appearances, Professor Nagle and I agree. The Supreme Court should not decide
election law cases on the basis of appearance rather than reality. The proper question
in a case like Shaw, which established the unconstitutional racial gerrymander claim, is
the extent to which taking race into account in districting inflicts real harm: "Even
when the government 'sends a message with its conduct' in a political equality case, we
should view that message as irrelevant if it has no bearing on real political power
relationships."
' 25
But on the broader question, the search for a unified theory of election law is
undoubtedly necessary, for three reasons. First, in election law cases, the partisan
motivations of judges and justices are commonly (if unfairly) called into question. The
extent to which courts can delineate the ground rules before any controversy serves to
diffuse claims of partisan bias. It does not matter whether the theory is process
theory,26 the political markets approach,27 or my own normative approach. Some
theory to constrain judges is better than none.28  Pre-commitment to theory, like
adherence to stare decisis, preserves the legitimacy of the courts as well as public
confidence in the judiciary as an institution.
Second, a unified theory holds out the promise of a bedrock component of the rule
of law: that like cases be treated alike. In The Supreme Court and Election Law, I offer
numerous examples of the Court getting caught up in doctrinal categories over
maintaining consistency across similar cases. For example, I criticize the Supreme
Court for having different "one person, one vote" rules for congressional districting on
the one hand, and state and local districting on the other, without support in
constitutional text or theory.29 It is silly to consider the equal population principle for
creating legislative districts in these two areas in isolation simply because one is
decided under Article I, Section 2,30 and the other decided under the Fourteenth
Amendment
31 of the Constitution.
32
23. Id. at 41 (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 607 (1993)).
24. Id. at 41-42.
25. HASEN, supra note 2, at 142. 1 similarly attack Bush v. Gore when read as a structural equal
protection case. See id. at 143. The appearance of corruption in campaign finance cases plays a somewhat
different role. There, the appearance serves more as a proxy for the evidentiary difficulty in proving actual
corruption than it does as a basis itself for the establishment of a constitutional right. I address this
evidentiary difficulty, and argue against reliance on the appearance of corruption, in a separate article. See
generally Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure Limits in
Ballot Measure Campaigns, S. CAL. L. REv (forthcoming 2005), draft available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=621321 (last visited Nov. 19, 2004).
26. See Michael C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?, 72 U. COLO. L.
REv. 923, 927-28 (2001).
27. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
28. This point itself is controversial. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of
Politics-and Be Thankful for Small Favors, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
283,283-84 (David Ryden ed., 2d ed. 2002).
29. See HASEN, supra note 2, at 24.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
31. U.S CONST. amend. XIV.
32. See HASEN, supra note 2, at 24.
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The Court itself is looking for connections among its election law cases. For
example, in Vieth v. Jubelirer33-the Supreme Court's most recent foray into the
partisan gerrymandering question-Justice Stevens looked to the racial gerrymandering
cases, 34 while Justice Kennedy suggested that the political patronage cases might be
fertile ground for lessons.
35
Because election law cases raise common questions about the law governing the
processes by which the people choose their representative and otherwise participate in
political decisionmaking, it makes sense to think of diverse election law cases
comparatively. That is not to say election law cases cannot benefit from consideration
of constitutional law issues outside the election context-it is that treating an election
law case simply as another constitutional case runs the risk of the Court mechanically
applying constitutional doctrine without considering how the Court's ruling will affect
political rights more broadly.
36
Consider the Vieth case again. The question before the Court was the extent to
which it is impermissible for those drawing legislative district lines to take voters' party
identification into account in drawing lines for partisan advantage. 37 Doctrinally, the
issue has been couched by the Court since Davis v. Bandemer38 in 1986 as one
involving the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 39 But how much does
equal protection law generally tell us about how the Court should resolve such claims?
As the Court's six opinions in the case reveal, very little indeed. Nor does Justice
Kennedy's call to look at First Amendment precedents to resolve partisan
gerrymandering cases seem likely to be successful.
4 1
Instead, lessons for how to resolve partisan gerrymandering claims are more likely
to be found in Voting Rights Act cases and even the Supreme Court's campaign finance
33. 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).
34. See id. at 1802-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35. See id. at 1796-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
36. See Nathaniel Persily, The Search for Comprehensive Descriptions and Prescriptions in Election
Law, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1509, 1515-16 (2003) (discussing whether election law exceptionalism is justified);
Gerken, supra note 19 at 741-48 (discussing whether election law exceptionalism is justified ); Pamela S.
Karlan, Constitutional Law, the Political Process, and the Bondage of Discipline, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1185,
1188(1999). Karlan states that:
My sense is that the emergence of courses like the ones the contributors to this symposium teach is
a good thing. But in addition to teaching students how to think about problems related to the
political process they may encounter as law clerks, litigators, or policymakers, the major virtue of
treating the law of the political process as a coherent subject lies in enabling scholars and students
to see connections among the various pieces of constitutional law and statutes that influence how
our politics is conducted. It would be unfortunate for everyone concerned if legal regulation of the
political process were to hive off completely from constitutional law and the two bodies were to
evolve separately to the point where there is little possibility of continued cross-fertilization. Just
as other aspects of constitutional law cannot be fully understood divorced from the political
institutions that produce them, so too our political institutions and practices cannot be understood
in a vacuum: they are a piece of constitutional law.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
37. See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1770.
38. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
39. See id. at Ill.
40. See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1770-73.
41. See Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan Gerrymandering
Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626, 635-36 (2004); Richard H. Pildes, Foreword-The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REv. 28,39 n.55 (2004).
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cases.42  Despite the fact that partisan gerrymandering fits doctrinally in the equal
protection box, Voting Rights Act cases involve issues of Congressional intent and
statutory interpretation, and campaign finance cases raise First Amendment freedom of
speech and association issues, consider the following questions common to these three
areas: (1) To what extent may incumbents pass laws likely to benefit their own
reelection in the name of promoting equality or other democratic values?; 43 (2) In
evaluating legal challenges, should courts consider the role that groups, rather than
individuals, play in the allocation of political power?; and (3) When is it appropriate for
courts to defer to the political processes rather than set the ground rules for electoral
competition?
To ask these questions is not to answer them, of course. But to ignore the benefits
of learning across similar cases seems foolish. Certainly McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission,44 a campaign finance case decided primarily on First Amendment
grounds, 45 tells us more about how the Court should decide Vieth than does Lawrence v.46
Texas, the homosexual sodomy case decided on equal protection grounds.
47
Finally, while I agree with Professor Nagle that a unified theory requires adoption
of some normative vision for election law, the decision to avoid a uniform theory raises
the same normative pitfalls. To use Professor Nagle's own example, one could view
campaign finance issues primarily through the lens of First Amendment free speech
cases. 48 But a free speech focus creates its own normative agenda-an agenda that
would lead the Court to strike down most campaign finance regulations.
My point here is not to argue whether it is better for the Court to strike down or
uphold campaign finance regulation, but rather to illustrate the benefits of a unified
theory. I could imagine someone crafting a "libertarian" election law with a unified
theme of the Court crafting election law case outcomes to maximize individual rights
and liberties. This unified theory would be similarly deregulationist with respect to
campaign finance as a First Amendment approach. But it would have the added benefit
of allowing the Court to decide other election law cases outside the First Amendment
area in a consistent manner.
IV. FUENTES-ROHWER AND THE SECOND-BEST THEORY OF ELECTION LAW: A COURT
OF BOLDNESS OR A COURT OF HUMILITY?
Professor Fuentes-Rohwer, while finding much in my book with which he agrees,
contemplates whether the Supreme Court should exit the political thicket entirely. After
noting my confession that I "no longer trust the Court to make contested value
42. See generally Heather Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and Doctrinal
Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2004) (drawing connections among these cases).
43. Professor Pildes notes Justice Scalia's strong concern about incumbency protection in the campaign
finance context but not in the partisan gerrymandering context. See Pildes, supra note 41, at 65.
44. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
45. Id. at 134-185.
46. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
47. See id. at 578-79. I have, however, noted a connection between Vieth and Lawrence: Justice
Kennedy's willingness to change constitutional standards with changing social values. See Hasen, supra note
41, at 640.
48. Nagle, supra note 1, at 42.
2004]
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judgments in political cases," 49 he suggests judicial abdication is the natural ending
point of my analysis: "If we don't trust the Court to decide questions involving
contested equality values, why should we trust the Court to make any determinations at
all?" 50  Moreover, he believes that even my prescription for a minimalist Court that
involves itself only in matters of core equality rights would eventually lead to the re-
emergence of the Court as Platonic guardian of the political process.51
Professor Fuentes-Rohwer's position has much to commend it, but he is fighting
the wrong battle. As an academic exercise, it is surely fair game to note, as Professor
Farber wrote in a recent review of my book, that "a vision of electoral law that
questions the legitimacy of [the one person, one vote] rule is as unsettling as a vision of
discrimination law that rejects the legitimacy of Brown [v. Board of Education].' 52 But
as a matter of current Supreme Court jurisprudence, the choice is not between some
intervention and no intervention. As the book demonstrates time and again, the Court is
nowhere near exiting the political thicket. And since the book's publication, the Court
has decided three blockbuster election law cases: McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission,5 3 Georgia v. Ashcroft,
54 and Vieth v. Jubelirer.55
Rather, the Court faces a choice among: (1) a potentially more modest role for the
Court in the electoral arena as I suggest; (2) the current high level of Supreme Court
intervention in the electoral arena; and (3) a markedly more aggressive role as set forth
by those in the structuralist, or political markets, camp of election law scholars.
56
There is, of course, no guarantee that a Court that has self-consciously and publicly
committed to my "minimalist ' 57 election law agenda would not inevitably slip into
activism; but surely it will be harder to intervene actively than under current
49. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 1, at 29 (quoting HASEN, supra note 2, at 154).
50. Id. at 29; see also id. at 30 ("[I]f the Court is simply 'making stuff up' as it goes along, why not
simply throw our hands up in the air and give up, exhort a return to the non-justiciability days of Colegrove
[v. Green]"?).
51. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 1, at 35.
52. Daniel A. Farber, Implementing Equality, 3 ELECTION L.J. 371, 383 (2004) (footnote omitted). Note,
however, that while I question the legitimacy of Reynolds (though not Baker), I do not necessarily reject it.
See HASEN, supra note 2, at 164. The aspect of Reynolds I question most is the strict application of the one
person, one vote principle, particularly on the local level. See id. at 56-60 (questioning whether the Court
should have adopted Justice Stewart's unmanageable alternative). I do not now question the right to a roughly
equally weighted vote, a right that Reynolds itself helped to create. See id. at 82-83.
Farber expresses some ambivalence on the structuralism question. See Farber, supra, at 376. However,
Farber makes an important point consistent with the rights-based approach: "[C]ourts should require evidence
that a practice has actually caused identifiable harm that a court can remedy .... If the court cannot identify a
specific harmful impact, it is likely to be sucked into a morass of speculation about systematic political
effects." Id. (footnote omitted).
53. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
54. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
55. 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).
56. See Pildes, supra note 41; Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L.
REv. 593, 600 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643, 648 (1998); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Surreply: Why
Elections?, 116 HARv. L. REv. 684, 690 (2002). For a sustained critique of Issacharoff and Pildes, see
HASEN, supra note 2 at 143-55 (2003); see also Nathaniel Persily, Reply, In Defense of Foxes Guarding
Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARv. L. REv.
649, 662 (2002); Lowenstein, supra note 28, at 299-301; Bruce E. Cain, Garrett's Temptation, 85 VA. L. REv.
1589, 1600 (1999).
57. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 1, at 29.
[Vol. 3 1:1
The Supreme Court and Election Law
jurisprudence that provides little such constraint. Additionally, the structural/political
markets approach is an invitation to judicial command-and-control of the political
process.
Contrast my minimalism with the hubristic approach of the structuralists. Professor
Fuentes-Rohwer mentions the important Vieth case, and it is here that structuralists
waged their strongest battle yet to move the Court away from a rights-based approach
and toward a focus on assuring an appropriate level of political competition. 58 In the
end, the Court-by accident, rather than by design-reached the right result.
Vieth was a 4-1-4 split decision. Four Justices issued a plurality opinion stating
that partisan gerrymandering claims should be considered nonjusticiable because of the
absence of a "judicially manageable" standard for separating permissible from
impermissible consideration of party affiliation of voters in the redistricting
enterprise.59 Four Justices would have adopted one of three invigorated tests to policeS60
partisan gerrymandering. Justice Kennedy, writing only for himself, cast the decisive
vote on the Court. He agreed with the four dissenters that partisan gerrymandering
cases remain justiciable, but he also agreed with the four Justices in the plurality that the
Vieth plaintiffs' claim must fail.6 1  According to Justice Kennedy, no one has yet
devised an acceptable test to separate out unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering from
constitutionally permissible consideration of voters' party information in redistricting.
62
As I have explained at greater length elsewhere, 63 the Vieth result is perfectly
defensible (though Justice Kennedy's suggestions of where to find a workable partisan
gerrymandering standard are a likely dead end).64 No social consensus existed in 1986,
when the Court decided Bandemer, or exists today on the extent to which it is
permissible to take voter party identification information into account in drawing
district lines. Justice Kennedy's crucial fifth vote in Vieth serves that same backstop
purpose as Bandemer has served: for the foreseeable future, partisan gerrymandering
claims will fail. But Justice Kennedy's vote allows the courts to reconsider the question
periodically as circumstances and perhaps, attitudes, change.
Professor Fuentes-Rohwer incorrectly suggests that a social consensus against• • 65
partisan gerrymandering exists, at least when measured through elite opinion. This
elite opinion criticizes "partisan gerrymandering" in the abstract-as did the Vieth
plurality, it is worth noting 6-and, so far as I can tell, it offers no meaningful standard
58. See generally Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, supra note 56 (advocating
aggressive judicial intervention to prevent gerrymandering).
59. See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1792 (plurality).
60. See id. at 1799 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1815 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id.
at 1822, 1828 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
61. See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1794-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62. See id. at 1796 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Because, in the case before us, we have no standard by
which to measure the burden appellants claim has been imposed on their representational rights, appellants
cannot establish that the alleged political classifications burden those same rights.").
63. See generally Hasen, supra note 41.
64. See Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1793.
65. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 1, at 32 ("Could it really be said that a social consensus against the
gerrymander does not exist? One would be hard-pressed to find a newspaper editorial in support of the
egregious gerrymanders of recent years, as seen in Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Texas, to name a
few.").
66. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1785 (plurality).
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for separating permissible from impermissible consideration of voter identification
information in districting. Moreover, the issue does not appear to be on the public's
radar screen. If, indeed, there is such social consensus against partisan gerrymandering,
why do we not see more attempts in the twenty-four states with the initiative process to
put limitations on partisan gerrymandering, such as a requirement of non-partisan
redistricting commissions?
But the structuralists would not stop at intervention by the Court to end partisan
gerrymandering. Indeed, a great debate among structuralists today concerns the best
way for the Court to use the Constitution to prohibit the practice of bipartisan
gerrymandering. The discussion of bipartisan gerrymandering takes for encouragement
some structural language in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Vieth,6 7 as well as a
footnoted statement in Justice Souter's dissenting opinion (joined by Justice Ginsburg)
noting that the Justice is "intrigued" by the political markets approach to resolving
election law disputes, and might eventually consider constitutional challenges to
bipartisan gerrymanders.
68
The structuralists are forthright that bipartisan gerrymandering-where legislators
create safe districts for both parties, often proportional to their strength in the
legislature-imposes no particular harm on any identifiable group of voters. Professor
Gerken calls the claim against bipartisan gerrymandering a "diffuse structural harm":
"Such an injury implicates an interest shared equally by all voters, such as a desire for
healthy democratic competition or an interest in the values the state privileges in
drawing district lines." 69 Similarly, Professor Pildes notes:
Bipartisan gerrymandering is emerging as a new, equally serious but different kind of
threat to American democracy. . . . Unlike partisan gerrymandering, bipartisan
gerrymandering does not represent a problem of skewed representation; [if
Democratic registrants and voters are 60% of a state,] 60% of the seats will be
controlled by Democratically-dominated election districts. The concern about
bipartisan gerrymandering is that it achieves representational parity and the cost of
eliminating competitive elections.
70
In Chapter Five of my book, I detail a number of arguments against judicial
intervention to prevent bipartisan gerrymandering including: (1) there is no strong
evidence that gerrymandering, rather than other factors, is primarily responsible for the
great incumbency advantage (consider, for example, the incumbency advantage enjoyed
by governors, who are elected statewide); (2) it is not clear why "political competition"
67. See id. at 1825 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
68. See id. at 1819-20 nn. 5, 6 (Souter, J., dissenting).
69. See Gerken, supra note 43, at 522.
70. Pildes, supra note 41, at 62-64. But see Farber, supra note 52, at 377 ("[T]he victims [of bipartisan
gerrymandering] are independent voters-a significant share of the population-who have effectively been
disenfranchised.") Farber of course does not mean that such voters are literally disenfranchised. He means
they are "stripped of meaningful participation in the electoral process." Id. Although Professor Farber
concludes that "judicial intervention seems warranted" to cure bipartisan gerrymandering, he favors an
approach that "direct[s] courts to remedy identifiable group or individual harms." Id. Unfortunately,
Professor Farber offers no guidance for how he would construct a remedy to ensure "meaningful
participation" by independent voters or even how to measure such harm. See id.
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should be the prime normative criterion under which the Court should craft its election
rules; (3) it is not clear that bipartisan gerrymanders lead to a lack of meaningful
political competition-there is more than ample political competition within state
legislatures and Congress, which many view as more polarized than ever; (4) there is a
danger in a court imposing a "one size fits all" solution for a perceived political
problem, which prevents state experimentation and different political arrangements that
may work well in particular jurisdictions.
71
Structuralist scholarship continues to frustrate me because, among other reasons, it
spends so little time justifying Court intervention to "cure" the "problem" of bipartisan
gerrymanders. But the scholarship has improved on its consideration of the question of
remedy. Professor Pildes, for example, notes that "the remedial problem is genuinely
difficult." 72 And both Professor Pildes and Professor Gerken seem to reject Professor
Issacharoff s earlier proposition,73 criticized at length in the book's Chapter Five, that
the Supreme Court declare all legislative districting conducted by elected officials
presumptively unconstitutional.
74
Professor Pildes notes that Professor Issacharoff's solution "might have taxed the
institutional limits of even the Warren Court."75  He also notes it could be "self-
defeating," "given how easily politicians can design purportedly independent
institutions that still enable politicians to have indirect influence or control."
76
Professor Gerken similarly notes that if Professor Issacharoff's prescription were
followed, we can be confident that the emergence of independent commissions "would
likely generate a whole new line of scholarship surrounding what kind of districting
plans best serve our democratic aims. [And] independent commissions would also raise
a different set of concerns about the proper policing of such intermediary
institutions ..... ,77
Professor Gerken has not yet had the opportunity to offer an alternative remedial
model the Court to address for the bipartisan gerrymandering issue.78 Professor Pildes
offers a somewhat more promising route than Professor Issacharoff. He suggests that
the Court should issue a vague pronouncement on the impermissibility of bipartisan
gerrymandering, which would lead politicians to limit their most egregious
gerrymanders so as to avoid litigation and the potential for a court-imposed districting
plan.
79
This suggestion echoes my call for the Supreme Court to use "judicially
unmanageable standards" when imposing a new political equality right. Judicial
71. See generally HASEN, supra note 2, at 138-56.
72. Pildes, supra note 41, at 66.
73. See Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, supra note 56, at 601.
74. See id.
75. Pildes, supra note 41, at 75 n.198.
76. Id.
77. Gerken, supra note 41, at 539. It is therefore surprising that Professor Gerken concludes that the
move to independent commissions would "extricate the Court," from these problems. See id. It sounds as
though courts would need to adjudicate such questions over the commissions.
78. See id. (suggesting, without elaboration, that "courts might limit their intervention to more tractable,
readily identifiable problems, like entrenchment").
79. Pildes, supra note 27.
80. See HASEN, supra note 2, at 73-75.
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unmanageability allows the Court to gather information from lower courts and the
political process before locking in a particular rule to be applied nationwide. Professor
Pildes similarly hopes that vague rules create incentives for political actors to avoid
uncertainty.
I am, however, less sanguine than Professor Pildes that vague rules will create
enough incentives for political actors to rein in their self-interested behavior. He points
to how unconstitutional gerrymandering cases under Shaw seemed to have dried up
following the 2000 census, and attributes this to legislators' new understanding of a
requirement for reasonable compactness in district shapes emanating from the vague
law in the Shaw line of cases. I have offered a different explanation, however, for the
demise of the Shaw claim, which I had predicted in my book: "[R]ecent Court
interpretations of the Voting Rights Act likely will deter the Justice Department from
pressuring states to create more majority-minority districts, thereby lessening the
number of successful Shaw claims." 82 More evidence is needed to show that it is the
vague standard of Shaw, rather than an end to pressure from the federal govemrnment,
that has stemmed the tide of Shaw cases.
Or take another example of lack of legislative self-control. In Illinois, if the state
legislature cannot agree on a legislative districting plan, redistricting is referred to a
commission containing four Democrats and four Republicans. 83 In the event a majority
of the commission cannot agree on a plan, a lottery is held, and one member of the
commission is given a tie-breaking vote.84 One might expect that this procedure would
be an external constraint to induce compromise. In fact, compromise does not result: in
each of the last three decades, there has been a lottery-not to mention litigation over
the system itself.
85
Still Professor Pildes's proposed remedial solution is indeed a step in the right
direction. Modesty on the part of structuralists, like modesty on the Court, is
commendable indeed. On this point, I am sure I would find Professor Fuentes-Rohwer
heartily agreeing.
V. CHARLES ON CORE AND CONTESTED EQUALITY RIGHTS: WHAT ROLE FOR THE
SUPREME COURT IN ELECTION LAW CASES?
Professor Nagle does not say too much about my normative approach, beyond
noting that there may be clashes among my three core principles of political equality.
86
I readily concede the point, and these are the kinds of cases, as I recognize in the
book,87 that are the most difficult and require a careful balancing of rights and interests.
Professor Fuentes-Rohwer similarly focuses on other issues. But it is here that
Professor Charles puts his energies, and it is to this issue I now turn.
81. Id.
82. HASEN, supra note 2, at 142; see also id. at n. 18 (crediting Dan Lowenstein with this observation).
83. See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW--CASES AND MATERIALS
323 (3d ed. 2004).
84. See id.
85. See id. at 323-24.
86. Nagle, supra note 1, at 38-39.
87. See HASEN, supra note 2, at 102-03.
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Professor Charles raises two related concerns. First, he contends that my core-
contested rights distinction "cannot be utilized to guide judicial review of the political
process" because I do not explain "why certain rights fit into one category as opposed to
another."88 Second, to the extent my categorization of core political rights depends
upon social near-consensus, it "renders judicial supervision unnecessary, except perhaps
to rein in jurisdictions that are outliers."
89
Thus, along the way, Professor Charles questions why I include in the core no
discrimination in voting on the basis of race or ethnicity but I don't include in the core
a right of no discrimination in voting on the basis of felon or ex-felon status, 91 or a right
to vote in presidential elections, 92 or the right of an identifiable political minority (the
Hasidim) to something akin to proportional interest representation. 93  During
Reconstruction, Professor Charles correctly notes, there was no consensus in Southern
states against discrimination in voting against African-Americans. How are we to know
what is core and what is contested?
I readily admit that my book is not a tome in political theory in which I defend in
detail certain timeless principles of democratic governance. "I do not claim to possess
the incontrovertible Truth on political equality issues. Instead, I intend this analysis as a
means of starting a dialogue about which political equality principles belong in the
core." 94 Moreover, I wrote the book from the position of "a citizen of the United States
at the beginning of the twenty-first century." 95 I welcome Professor Charles to the
dialogue over which political equality principles belong in the core.
From my perspective, on the issues Professor Charles flags, it is easy to separate
core from contested political equality rights through the lens of social consensus.
"Today, no credible speaker in the public sphere would contend that the right to vote
should be denied, for example, to African-Americans or Jews." 96 But there are many
who defend felon disenfranchisement laws, even against legal challenge.
97
Controversies during the 1990s over the appointment of Lani Guinier to the Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division show that there remains deep social division over
the propriety of proportional representation in U.S. legislative bodies. And Professor
Raskin has recently written a strong argument in favor of adding a right to vote for
President to the U.S. Constitution,98 but there does not appear yet to be much political
backing for such a change.
88. Charles, supra note 1, at 21.
89. Id. at 22.
90. Id. at 23.
91. Id. at 23-24.
92. Id. at 21.
93. Id. at 23.
94. HASEN, supra note 2, at 81.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 82.
97. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Ending Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States: Litigation or
Legislation?, Democratic Audit of Australia, (Sept. 2004), available at
http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au/HasenFelonDisenfranchisementPaper.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
98. See generally Jamin Raskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment for the U.S. Constitution: Confronting
America's Structural Democracy Deficit, 3 ELECTION L.J. 559 (2004).
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As a matter of personal political preference, I would very much favor an end to
felon disenfranchisement (even for those currently incarcerated) as well as adoption of
Professor Raskin's amendment (although I am more ambivalent about moves toward
proportional representation). But the question is where such decisions should be made,
in the courts or through the political process? Once the door is opened for judicial
intervention, it cannot be closed. And liberal judicial activism begets conservative
activism in another era. So the Warren Court begets the Rehnquist Court.
The alternative to judicial intervention is not stagnation; it is the court allowing the
political process to work as it should. As Professor Karlan has detailed, a number of
states are repealing or limiting their felon disenfranchisement laws. 9 9 Congress, too,
could limit such laws on the state level.
100
Gerrymandering provides another example. In the book, I note my agreement with
the Supreme Court's decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden lol not to create a
constitutional right to proportional interest representation for minorities 102 (just as I
noted above my agreement with the Court in Vieth not to create an aggressive test to
police claims of partisan gerrymandering). But I also urge the Court to defer to the
Congressional decision (through Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act) to create a similar
right to proportional interest representation legislatively.
Professor Charles is right that the role I have set forth for the Supreme Court is
certainly a limited one-mainly to police the outliers, like those few states by 1966 that
had not eliminated poll taxes. 10 3 Professor Charles concludes that "if the purpose of
judicial review of laws that affect the fundamental nature of democratic politics is to
simply reinforce and ratify majoritarian norms, of what use is it?"
' 104
Professor Charles minimizes the values of policing outliers; to those poor voters in
Virginia who suffered with a state poll tax as late as 1965, I am certain Court
intervention was welcome. Professor Charles also ignores the other important, yet less
frequently used, role for the Court, namely, to protect the few basic rights essential to a
democracy that exist beyond social consensus. To use the example I give in the book,
"Imagine what I hope is a very unlikely scenario: in the ongoing 'war on terrorism,'
public opinion shifts in a dramatic and antidemocratic fashion so that jurisdictions
started passing popular laws denying the right to vote to Arab-Americans."' 105  I
conclude that the Court "should unequivocally strike such laws down, regardless of
popular opinion and regardless of the consequences for the justices on the Court."
10 6
This is the answer to Charles's question about why the Court should have protected
African-American voting rights despite white Southern opposition during
reconstruction.
99. Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate Over Felon
Disenfranchisement, Stanford Law School Public Law Working Paper No. 75 at 2, available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=-484543 (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
100. But it has not necessarily done so through the Voting Rights Act. See Hasen, supra note 97, at 2-3.
101. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
102. See id. at 75-76.
103. See HASEN, supra note 2, at 74.
104. Charles, supra note 1, at 24.
105. HASEN, supra note 1, at 79-80.
106. Id. at 80.
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In addition to these two crucial roles (policing outliers and protecting the deep core
of equality rights), the Court is to play another crucial role: it must engage in careful
balancing to determine when it is appropriate to defer to legislative decisions to enact
certain political equality measures that clash with individual rights.1
0 7
Still, the role for the Supreme Court in election cases would be comparatively
minimal: no policing of partisan (much less bipartisan) gerrymanders, no "discovered"
constitutional right to proportional interest representation for certain groups, no judicial
elimination of felon disenfranchisement through interpretation of the United States
Constitution.
A more minimal role for the Supreme Court might be bad for election law as its
own field of study (though students would appreciate a casebook under 1,000
pages! 108). But it would be good for the United States and the health of its democracy.
107. See generally id. at 101-37.
108. The casebook I co-edit is 1024 pages exclusive of the index and tables. LOWENSTEIN & HASEN,
supra note 85. The other election law casebook is 1172 pages exclusive of index and appendices. SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLHAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY (rev. 2d ed. 2001).
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